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GOOGLE V. COMMISSIONER: A COMPARISON OF 
EUROPEAN UNION AND UNITED STATES ANTITRUST LAW 
Travis Clark 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Look down at your phone.  Unlock the home screen.  What applications 
do you see?  If you have an iPhone, you probably see iCalendar, Safari, and 
the App Store.  If you have a Windows Phone, you probably see Microsoft 
Outlook, Internet Explorer, and the Windows App Store.  If you have an 
Android Phone, you probably see Google Search, Chrome Browser, and 
Google Play.  Are you satisfied with what you see?  Do you feel like your 
choice of smartphone applications (“apps”) is severely limited?  Do you feel 
like you have been denied access from an innovative mobile phone operating 
system?  Or, are you glad that when you turned on your new smartphone, 
several apps were waiting for you and there was an app store where you 
could download more?  Imagine turning on your new smartphone and the 
only features available were text messaging, phone calls, and a working 
clock.  Without the Google Play Store or the App Store, would you know 
where to begin? 
In 2007, Google launched its free open-source operating 
systemAndroid.1  The HTC Dream, introduced in 2008, was the first 
mobile device available with Google’s Android operating system 
(“Android” or “Android OS”).2  With Android OS and a new line of multi-
touch interface smartphones, Google set forth to compete directly with Apple 
iOS and the iPhone.  By 2012, Android dominated the smartphone market 
worldwide3that dominance continues to this day, and the European 
 
 J.D. Candidate, 2017, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2013, Bucknell 
University.  Thank you to Professor Tracy Kaye, my fellow Law Review editors, and my 
European Union Business Law classmates for their help and guidance throughout the writing 
of this Comment. I also want to thank Zoey Goldnick and Joshua Allen for their help editing 
and for their useful insight into the ice cream industry.  
 1  Kent Walker, Android: Choice at every turn, GOOGLE BLOG: GOOGLE IN EUR. (Nov. 
10, 2016), https://blog.google/topics/google-europe/android-choice-competition-response-
europe/. 
 2  Jacqui Cheng, T-Mobile, Google Finally Unveil the First Android Phone, 
ARSTECHNICA (Sept. 23, 2008, 10:56 AM), https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2008/09/t-
mobile-google-finally-unveil-the-first-android-phone/. 
 3  Anick Jesdanun, Android dominates smartphone market, USA TODAY (Aug. 8, 2012, 
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Commission (“the Commission”) has taken notice.4  In April 2015, the 
Commission initiated a formal investigation into Google’s licensing practice 
of Android and its proprietary mobile apps.5  A year later, the Commission 
sent Google an official Statement of Objections (SO) announcing its 
“preliminary view that Google has implemented a strategy on mobile devices 
to preserve and strengthen its dominance in general internet search.”6  In 
November 2016, Google responded to the Commission’s SO stating that its 
Android open-source platform has generated innovation, promoted 
competition, and lowered prices throughout the European market.7 
This Comment examines the Commission’s antitrust case against 
Google.  Essentially, the Commission alleges that Google abused its 
dominant position in various markets by conditioning the pre-installation of 
its proprietary apps on the exclusive use of its Android OS.8  In both the 
European Union (E.U.) and the United States (U.S.), dominant companies 
face antitrust scrutiny when they abuse their market position by “tying” 
separate products together. This Comment compares the E.U. and U.S. 
treatment of tying claims, specifically focusing on Google’s tying of its 
Android OS to its suite of mobile apps (“Google Mobile Suite” or “GMS”).  
Part II provides a brief background on E.U. and U.S. antitrust jurisprudence 
and introduces the economics of tying arrangements.  Part III compares the 
two tying cases brought against Microsoft in the E.U. and U.S., and 
highlights the differences between the two jurisdictions’ antitrust 
jurisprudence.  Part IV provides the background for the Commission’s case 
against Google and analyzes potential issues the Commission faces under the 
Microsoft framework.9  Part V briefly concludes with the proposition that the 
Commission’s case against Google does more to harm consumers, than to 









 4  See European Commission Press Release IP/16/1492, Antitrust: Commission Sends 
Statement of Objections to Google on Android Operating System and Applications (Apr. 20, 
2016) [hereinafter Statement of Objections]. 
 5  See id. 
 6  Id. 
 7  Walker, supra note 1.  
 8  Statement of Objections, supra note 4. 
 9  See Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3619. 
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II. AN INTRODUCTION TO ANTITRUST JURISPRUDENCE AND TYING 
ARRANGEMENTS 
A. Antitrust Laws in the United States 
The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) are responsible for prosecuting violations of the U.S. 
antitrust laws.10  However, private parties may also bring antitrust claims 
against other private parties.11  Tying arrangements can be challenged under 
four federal provisions: (1) section 1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits 
agreements “in restraint of trade,”12 (2) section 2 of the Sherman Act, which 
prohibits monopolization,13 (3) section 3 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits 
exclusive arrangements that may “substantially lessen competition,”14 and 
(4) section 5 of the FTC Act, which prohibits “unfair methods of 
competition.”15  The Sherman Act applies to tied goods and services, while 
the Clayton Act only applies to the tying of goods.16  This Comment mainly 
focuses on the tying analysis under the Sherman Act, but because courts 
often rely on tying precedent from claims brought under different statutory 
provisions, it should be noted that the standards for analyzing tying 
arrangements produce similar results under all the applicable provisions.17 
B. Antitrust Laws in the European Union 
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) is the 
main source of E.U. antitrust law.18  Article 101, the equivalent of section 1 
of the Sherman Act, prohibits “all agreements between undertakings, 
decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may 
affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect 
the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal 
market.”19  In regard to tying arrangements, Article 101 prohibits 
 
 10  DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL 
OPERATIONS (1995), https://www.justice.gov/atr/antitrust-enforcement-guidelines-intern 
ational-operations. 
 11  FED. TRADE COMM’N, GUIDE TO ANTITRUST LAWS, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-
advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws (last visited Nov. 29, 2016). 
 12  15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
 13  15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 14  15 U.S.C. § 14 (2012). 
 15  15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012). 
 16  James F. Ponsoldt & Christopher D. David, A Comparison Between U.S. and E.U. 
Antitrust Treatment of Tying Claims Against Microsoft: When Should the Bundling of 
Computer Software be Permitted?, 27 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 421, 425 (2007). 
 17  Id. 
 18  Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Oct. 
26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47 [hereinafter TFEU]. 
 19  Id. art. 101(1). 
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anticompetitive agreements that “make the conclusion of contracts subject 
to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by 
their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the 
subject of such contracts.”20  However, these provisions may be overcome in 
the case of any agreement or practice: 
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of 
goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while 
allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and which 
does not: (a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions 
which are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives; 
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating 
competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in 
question.21 
Article 102 parallels section 2 of the Sherman Act, and prohibits any 
abuse by “undertakings of a dominant position within the internal market or 
in a substantial part of it . . . so far as it may affect trade between Member 
States.”22  In regard to tying arrangements, Article 102 states that an abuse 
may occur in “making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by 
the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or 
according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such 
contracts.”23  In contrast to Article 101, which prohibits anticompetitive 
tying absent a showing of market power, Article 102 prohibits tying by a 
dominant undertaking absent any actual anticompetitive effect.24  This 
Comment follows the Commission’s allegations against Google by focusing 
on tying arrangements analyzed under Article 102. 
Regulation 1/2003 (the “Antitrust Regulation”) provides the 
Commission with the investigative powers to enforce Article 102.25  An 
Article 102 investigation can be initiated either by the Commission itself, or 
upon receipt of a complaint from a competitor, Member State, or 
individual.26  The first step for the Commission is to determine whether the 
undertaking concerned is dominant within the relevant market.27  This 
requires the Commission to define the relevant product and geographic 
 
 20  Id. art. 101(1)(e). 
 21  Id. art. 101(3)(a)(b). 
 22  Id. art. 102. 
 23  Id. art. 102(d). 
 24  See Ponsoldt & David, supra note 16, at 441 (Articles 81 and 82 are now Articles 101 
and 102, respectively).  
 25  Council Regulation 1/2003/EC on the Implementation of the Rules of Competition, 
2002 O.J. L 1/3 [hereinafter Antitrust Regulation]. 
 26  Id. art. 17, at 13.  
 27  Competition: Antitrust procedures in abuse of dominance, EUROPEAN COMM’N, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/procedures_102_en.html (last updated Aug. 16, 
2013). 
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markets.28  The product market is “made of all products/services which the 
consumer considers to be a substitute for each other due to their 
characteristics, their price and their intended use.”29  The geographic market 
is “an area in which the conditions of competition for a given product are 
homogenous.”30  The Commission commonly relies on a firm’s market share 
to determine whether the concerned firm is dominanta market share over 
forty percent is a preliminary indication of dominance.31  Although the 
Commission may determine the firm holds a dominant position in the 
relevant market, a position of dominance is not illegal by itself.32  Rather, the 
Commission must determine whether the firm has “abused” its dominant 
position.33 
Notably, the Commission takes the view that “a dominant company has 
a special responsibility to ensure that its conduct does not distort 
competition.”34  This heightened responsibility precludes dominant firms 
from behavior such as, “requiring that buyers purchase all units of a 
particular product only from the dominant company (exclusive purchasing); 
setting prices at a loss-making level (predation); refusing to supply input 
indispensable for competition in an ancillary market; [and] charging 
excessive prices.”35 
After an investigation, the Commission may issue a statement of 
objections (SO), which informs the undertaking of the Commission’s 
concerns with the conduct at issue.36  A company is entitled to access any 
non-confidential files from the investigation and reply to the SO in writing.37  
The company may also request an oral hearing in front of an independent 
hearing officer.38  After examining the company’s response, the Commission 
can choose to move forward with all or part of its initial objections and close 
the case.39  Article 7 of the Antitrust Regulation permits the Commission to 
draft a decision prohibiting the identified violations.40  The Advisory 
Committee, composed of the Member States’ competition representatives, 
then provides a final check of the Commission’s decision and can submit it 
 
 28  See id. 
 29  Id. 
 30  Id. 
 31  Id. 
 32  See id. 
 33  See EUROPEAN COMM’N, supra note 27. 
 34  Id. 
 35  Id. 
 36  See id. 
 37  See Antitrust Regulation, supra note 25, art. 27, at 19. 
 38  See id. 
 39  EUROPEAN COMM’N, supra note 27. 
 40  Antitrust Regulation, supra note 25, art. 7, at 9. 
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to the College of Commissioners to be formally adopted.41  Under the 
Antitrust Regulation, the Commission can impose finesup to ten percent 
of a firm’s annual revenueon an undertaking found in violation of Article 
102.42  Companies maintain the right to appeal the decision to the General 
Court of the European Union (GC), which can increase, reduce, or cancel the 
fine imposed by the Commission.43  Ultimately, the Commission and/or the 
defendant-firm can appeal the GC’s ruling to the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU).44 
C. Tying Arrangements and I-Scream 
Tying generally involves a firm conditioning the sale of one product 
(the tying good) on the sale of another product (the tied good).45  For 
example, Jay makes homemade ice cream and sells it in tubs to local ice 
cream parlors.  Recognizing that every good scoop of ice cream deserves a 
fresh waffle cone, Jay begins to insist that anyone wishing to sell his ice 
cream also sell his waffle cones.  That would be a tying arrangement in which 
ice cream is the tying good and waffle cones are the tied good. 
Bundling is a similar practice in which a firm offers several products in 
a package deal.  Pure bundling occurs where the firm only offers the products 
together and not separatelye.g., surgery with anesthesia.46  Mixed 
bundling occurs where the firm sells the various products both packaged 
together and separately, but extremely discounts the packaged pricee.g., 
shampoo and conditioner.47 
Tying and bundling practices raise anticompetitive concerns when a 
firm can leverage its monopoly power in market A into market B.48  Imagine 
if Jay’s next door neighbor, Timmy, was a waffle cone competitor who sells 
his cones to the local parlor, I-Scream.  But I-Scream wishes to sell Jay’s ice 
cream because demand for it is so high.  Jay, realizing he has significant 
power in the homemade ice cream market, requires I-Scream and other 
dealers purchasing his ice cream to exclusively sell his waffle cones.  If I-
Scream does not exclusively sell Jay’s waffle cones, then Jay will not 
provide I-Scream with his highly-demanded ice cream.  Consequently, I-
Scream is not in an economically reasonable position to purchase and sell 
 
 41  Id. art. 14, at 11. 
 42  Id. art. 23, at 17. 
 43  EUROPEAN COMM’N, supra note 27. 
 44  See id. 
 45  HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 198 
(2005). 
 46  JURIAN LANGER, TYING AND BUNDLING AS A LEVERAGING CONCERN UNDER EC 
COMPETITION LAW 4 (2007). 
 47  Id. 
 48  HOVENKAMP, supra note 45, at 201. 
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Timmy’s waffle cones.  Not only is Timmy hurt as a waffle cone competitor, 
but consumers may also be negatively affected by the elimination of 
substitute waffle cones. 
The main concern is that tying or bundling certain products “prevents 
goods from competing directly for consumer choice on their merits, i.e., 
being selected as a result of ‘buyers’ independent judgment.”49  In the 
example, I-Scream’s freedom to select the best bargain in the waffle cone 
market is impaired by its desire to buy Jay’s homemade ice-cream.  In 
addition, I-Scream’s ability to evaluate the true cost of either product is 
foggedeven if Timmy’s waffle cones are of better quality or cheaper, I-
Scream will be unwilling to forego Jay’s highly demanded ice-cream in order 
to purchase Timmy’s cones.  Accordingly, direct competition between Jay 
and Timmy’s waffle cones is foreclosed because I-Scream is forced to buy 
Jay’s waffle cones by simply buying Jay’s homemade ice-cream. 
Nevertheless, selling products together can generate efficiencies.50  For 
example, cost savings can appear in the consumption and/or the production 
sides.51  When consumers would buy both products A and B separately, and 
the product valuations are positively correlated, the cost savings from selling 
the products together creates an incentive for a firm to bundle the goods.52  
The ability for consumers to purchase complementary products from the 
same supplier is a consumption efficiencysearch costs are reduced where 
an efficient firm can bundle the most consumer satisfying combination of 
products.53  Bundling may also reduce a supplier’s production and 
distribution costs.54  Moreover, “bundling may assure product quality by 
neutralizing: (1) the confusion externality regarding the source of poor 
performance, and (2) the cost-sharing externality when consumers 
knowingly use inferior products with the bundling good.”55  Essentially, the 
efficiency gains associated with tying and bundling certain products may 
ultimately benefit consumers, and thus competition. 
III. THE MICROSOFT SAGA 
In 2001, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
held that Microsoft’s bundling of Windows PC operating system (“Windows 
OS”) and Internet Explorer was not a per se antitrust violation for attempted 
 
 49  United States v. Microsoft Corp. (Microsoft III), 253 F.3d 34, 87 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
(quoting Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 13 (1984)). 
 50  LANGER, supra note 46, at 24. 
 51  See id. 
 52  See id. 
 53  Id. at 8. 
 54  Id. at 89. 
 55  Id. at 9. 
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monopolization of the internet browser market.56  The court remanded the 
issue to the lower court with instructions to analyze the tying arrangement 
under a “rule of reason” standard.57  Consequently, the DOJ decided not to 
pursue the issue any further, and Microsoft continued to bundle its 
products.58  In contrast, in 2007, the European Union General Court affirmed 
the Commission’s finding that Microsoft abused its dominant position by 
bundling Windows OS with Windows Media Player (WMP).59  The 
Commission required Microsoft to offer a version of Windows OS without 
WMP in addition to the bundled version.60  Although the allegations and the 
judicial tests set forth in both cases had many similarities, the courts reached 
contrasting resolutions.61  Nevertheless, both the U.S. and E.U. Microsoft 
cases significantly impacted their respective antitrust tying jurisprudence. 
The E.U. and U.S. judicial tests for tying practices follow similar steps.  
Tying is anticompetitiveand therefore a violation of antitrust lawsif (1) 
the tying and tied products are two separate products; (2) the undertaking 
concerned is dominant in the market for the tying product; (3) the practice 
does not give customers a choice to obtain the tying product without the tied 
product (coercion); and (4) the practice in question forecloses competition.62  
In the E.U., the Commission also examines the objective justifications 
advanced by the defendanthowever, E.U. courts generally accept the 
Commission’s examination and refrain from further analysis.63  In the U.S., 
courts apply a “rule of reason” standard, which weighs a defendant’s 
procompetitive justifications against the anticompetitive effects of the 
questioned practice.64  The following section compares and contrasts the 
jurisdictional approaches to this “cohesive” test through the lens of the 
Microsoft cases.65  For purposes of this Comment, it is assumed that Google 
is dominant in every relevant market.  Thus, the second step of the 
testdetermining whether the undertaking is dominant in the 
marketplacewill not be discussed. 
 
 56  United States v. Microsoft Corp. (Microsoft III), 253 F.3d 34, 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 57  Id. 
 58  Nicholas Economides & Ioannis Lianos, The Elusive Antitrust Standard on Bundling 
in Europe and in the United States in the Aftermath of the Microsoft Cases, 76 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 483, 48384 (2009). 
 59  Microsoft Corp. v. Commission, Case T201/04, [2007] E.C.R. II1491. 
 60  Economides & Lianos, supra note 58, at 484. 
 61  See id. 
 62  United States v. Microsoft Corp. (Microsoft III), 253 F.3d 34, 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001); 
Microsoft, [2007] E.C.R. II1491. 
 63  See Microsoft, [2007] E.C.R. II1491. 
 64  See Microsoft III, 253 F.3d at 9495. 
 65  See id.; Microsoft, [2007] E.C.R. II1491. 
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A. Separate Products Test 
The separate products test is the first step in analyzing tying 
arrangements in the E.U. and U.S.  The central question is whether the tied 
or bundled goods are separate products or a single product.  The separate 
products test serves as a screening device to exclude from antitrust scrutiny 
practices with obvious efficiency gains that benefit consumers.66  Two items 
may be considered a single product when they enjoy certain economies of 
joint production and distribution that can only be achieved by offering them 
as a package.67  The separate products test can be analyzed from a demand-
side and a supply-side perspective.68  While the separate products test in the 
U.S. recognizes the presence of efficiency gains, the separate products test 
in the E.U. functions as a proxy for anticompetitive effects.69 
In the U.S., the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals departed from the 
Supreme Court’s tying precedents, which relied on the separate products test 
as a screening mechanism for determining whether a tying arrangement was 
per se unlawful.70  The court stated that the rationale behind the separate 
products test was “a rough proxy for whether a tying arrangement may, on 
balance, be welfare-enhancing, and unsuited to per se condemnation.”71  
Essentially, the court determined that the separate products test was 
“backward-looking” and failed to appreciate the net efficiencies of welfare-
enhancing innovation.72  Accordingly, the court held that software bundles 
needed to be analyzed under a rule of reason standard that weighs any 
anticompetitive effects against the efficiency gains that may benefit 
consumers.73  Thus, the court remanded the case to the lower court, but the 
DOJ ultimately opted out of further litigating the issue.74 
In the E.U., under Article 102, “products are distinct if, in the absence 
of tying or bundling, from the customer’s perspective, the products are or 
would be purchased separately.”75  The Commission and E.U. courts focus 
the separate products inquiry on both the consumer demand and the supply-
oriented character of the separate products test.76  However, E.U. 
 
 66  See Economides & Lianos, supra note 58, at 519. 
 67  Id. at 51920. 
 68  See J. Gregory Sidak, Do Free Mobile Apps Harm Consumers?, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
619, 680 (2015). 
 69  Economides & Lianos, supra note 58, at 52325. 
 70  See Microsoft III, 253 F.3d at 8485. 
 71  Id. at 87. 
 72  Id. at 89. 
 73  Id. at 95. 
 74  Economides & Lianos, supra note 58, at 48384. 
 75  Id. at 520; see also Microsoft Corp., COMP/37.792, Commission Decision, [2004], 
O.J. L 32/33, ¶ 803. 
 76  See Economides & Lianos, supra note 58, at 52122. 
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jurisprudence arguably has shifted from a more demand-oriented test to a 
supply-side analysis focused on protecting non-dominant competitors in the 
tied product market.77 
From the consumer demand perspective, evidence of separate products 
includes: consumers purchasing products separately when given a choice, 
and firms tending to tie the products together in a competitive market.78  In 
Microsoft, the court ruled that “the distinctness of products . . . has to be 
assessed with a view to consumer demand,” and “in the absence of 
independent demand for the allegedly tied product, there can be no question 
of separate products and no abusive tying.”79  Microsoft argued that its WMP 
combined with its Windows PC operating system formed a single, integral 
product, because customers wanted to purchase the products together.80  The 
court rejected Microsoft’s argument because “the fact that the market 
provides media players separately is evidence for separate consumer demand 
for media players, distinguishable from the demand for client PC operating 
systems.”81 
Significantly, the court’s analysis focused more on the supply-side, 
examining the existence of competing suppliers in the alleged tied product 
market to determine whether WMP and Windows PC operating system were 
distinct products.82  The court stressed that with complementary products 
like the Windows PC operating system and application software, “it is quite 
possible that customers will wish to obtain the products together, but from 
different sources.”83  Relying on previous CJEU case law, the court noted 
the presence of “independent companies specializing in the manufacture and 
sale of the tied product constitutes serious evidence of the existence of a 
separate market for that product.”84  Thus, the fact that consumers had 
acquired media players separately from operating systems before and after 
Microsoft’s introduction of WMP demonstrated that consumers regarded the 
products as separate.85 
The court’s supply oriented approach makes sense when viewing the 
separate products test in conjunction with the court’s interpretation of the 
foreclosure of competition.86  The presence in the tied market of specialized 
companies indicates that there is an independent demand for the tied product 
 
 77  See id. at 522. 
 78  Id. at 520. 
 79  Microsoft Corp. v. Commission, Case T201/04, [2007] E.C.R. II1491, ¶¶ 91718. 
 80  Id. ¶ 912. 
 81  Microsoft Corp., COMP/37.792, Commission Decision, ¶¶ 80304. 
 82  Microsoft, [2007] E.C.R. II1491, ¶ 932. 
 83  Id. ¶ 922. 
 84  Id. ¶ 927 (internal citations omitted). 
 85  Id. ¶ 932. 
 86  See Economides & Lianos, supra note 58, at 522. 
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without the tying product.  If competitors cannot profitably operate in the 
tied product market due to the dominant undertaking’s practice, then 
competition is foreclosed.  The court’s supply-side analysis echoes the E.U. 
concern with the exclusion of rival suppliers, which constitutes a main point 
of divergence between E.U. and U.S. antitrust jurisprudence.87 
B. Coercion 
The second step in analyzing tying arrangements is determining 
whether the tying of two distinct products precludes consumers from 
choosing to obtain the tying product without the tied product.  According to 
Herbert Hovenkamp: 
coercion should result from (1) an absolute refusal to sell the tying 
product without the tied product; (2) a discount, rebate or other 
financial incentive given to buyers who also take the tied product; 
[or] (3) technological design that makes it impossible to sell the 
tying product without the tied product.88 
The coercion test is designed to distinguish between the various forms 
of tying arrangementscontractual, technological integration, or financial 
incentivesand how they affect consumers.89  In both the E.U. and the U.S., 
slightly different standards may apply to each form of tying.90  Accordingly, 
the E.U. and the U.S. arguably diverge in their analysis of coercion.  
However, for purposes of this Comment, the potential differences in the 
standards applied to each form are inconsequential.  Thus, this section 
primarily focuses on the E.U. interpretation of the coercion test. 
A tying arrangement violates E.U. antitrust law if the dominant 
undertaking does not give customers a choice to obtain the tying product 
without the tied product.91  Coercion may result from a dominant undertaking 
refusing to sell one product without the other through a contractual clause, a 
dominant undertaking pressuring the customer to take both products through 
financial incentive or favorable treatment, or a consumer’s inability to 
technically remove one product from the other.92  In Microsoft, the court 
stated that the coercion test is “merely expressing in different words the 
concept that bundling assumes that consumers are compelled, directly or 
indirectly, to accept ‘supplementary obligations,’ such as those referred to in 
Article [102(d)] EC.”93 
 
 87  See id. 
 88  HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 306, 410 (3d ed. 2005). 
 89  Economides & Lianos, supra note 58, at 52829. 
 90  See id. at 52932. 
 91  Microsoft Corp. v. Commission, Case T201/04, [2007] E.C.R. II1491, ¶¶ 86064. 
 92  Economides & Lianos, supra note 58, at 529. 
 93  Microsoft, [2007] E.C.R. II1491, ¶ 864.  The court also noted the Commission 
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In Microsoft, the court held that Microsoft had contractually and 
technically coerced its customers (i.e., the manufacturers), which then passed 
on to the end consumers.94  The court found that Microsoft’s licensing system 
made it impossible for manufacturers to obtain a license from Microsoft to 
install a Windows OS without WMP.95  Microsoft argued that the integration 
of WMP with the Windows OS did not amount to coercion because 
customers (1) received WMP free of charge; (2) were not obligated to use 
WMP; and (3) could install and use competing media players.96  The court 
rejected each of Microsoft’s arguments in turn.  First, the court found that 
WMP was not provided free of charge, but rather, its cost was included in 
the total price of the Windows OS.97  Second, the court stated that “neither 
Article [102(d)] nor the case law on bundling requires that consumers must 
be forced to use the tied product or prevented from using the same product 
supplied by a competitor of the dominant undertaking.”98  Third, although 
manufacturers could install competing media players, the court found that 
they could not technically uninstall WMP.99  Thus, manufacturers were 
deterred from pre-installing other media players, which incentivized end 
consumers to use WMP notwithstanding the potentially “higher quality” 
media players offered by competitors.100 
E.U. antitrust law emphasizes consumer sovereignty, rather than the 
concept of consumer welfare.101  The E.U. takes the position that consumer 
sovereignty is preserved when the consumers can influence price, quality, 
and ultimately the innovative process according to their own preferences.102  
The Microsoft court’s focus on a competitor’s ability to compete for the pre-
installation of media players, and its disregard for the consumers’ ability to 
install alternative media players, implies a strict standard that seems to 
contradict the E.U.’s goal of preserving consumer sovereignty.  On the one 
hand, Microsoft restricted the manufacturers’ choice of which media player 
it pre-installed on Windows OS.  Theoretically, the Commission was 
concerned that Microsoft would not respond to consumer preferences if it 
could coerce the intermediaries to deny its media player competitors.  
 
appropriately relied on Article 102(d) in its entirety because its list of supplementary 
obligations is not exhaustive.  See id. ¶ 861. 
 94  Id. ¶ 96365. 
 95  Id. 
 96  Id. ¶ 960. 
 97  Id. ¶ 968; but see Economides & Lianos, supra note 58, at 529 (“This argument seems 
paradoxical because the court had already accepted that the two products were distinct, and it 
should have therefore examined Microsoft’s arguments from that perspective.”). 
 98  Microsoft, [2007] E.C.R. II1491, ¶ 970. 
 99  Id. ¶ 971. 
 100  Id. 
 101  See Economides & Lianos, supra note 58, at 542–43. 
 102  See id. at 543. 
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However, many legitimate commercial practices have the same exclusionary 
effect of hindering a rival’s ability to compete.103  In the absence of a clear, 
ex ante, identification of whether a practice is illegal, companies become 
discouraged from introducing their innovative products to the market free of 
charge.104  A strict standard that does not consider the end consumer’s ability 
to obtain alternative products fails to recognize the efficiency gainssuch 
as lower costs and higher quality inputsthat may outweigh any 
anticompetitive effects by allowing consumers to access the competitive 
market with little-to-no cost.  Thus, E.U. courts should allocate weight to the 
efficiency gains passed on to end consumers to ensure that tying 
arrangements that could enhance consumer sovereignty are not cursorily 
deemed unlawful. 
C. Foreclosure of Competition 
The final step105 in analyzing tying arrangements is determining 
whether the tying of two distinct products forecloses competition in the 
relevant market.  The central question is whether the practice has an overall 
anticompetitive effect on competition.  However, the E.U. and U.S. 
approaches to determining the anticompetitive effects of a practice are far 
from cohesive.  The differences in the jurisdictional interpretations of 
anticompetitive foreclosure illustrate the distinct theoretical foundations of 
E.U. and U.S. antitrust law.  There are three key points of divergence: (1) 
whether the foreclosure of competition requires something more than 
excluding or hindering competitors; (2) whether the anticompetitive effect 
should be presumed from the nature of the practice and the existence of a 
dominant undertaking; and (3) who has the burden to prove that the practice 
is either anticompetitive or procompetitive.106 
On one hand, U.S. antitrust law is not concerned with protecting 
competitors, but rather, competition.107  Accordingly, U.S. courts require 
more than mere evidence of competitors being harmed.108  Thus, the 
foreclosure of competition test, utilized in the U.S., weighs the 
anticompetitive effects of a practice with its procompetitive benefitsand 
 
 103  See id. at 54446. 
 104  Id. at 545. 
 105  The final step can be broken down into multiple steps, such as (1) identifying the 
anticompetitive effect; (2) examining the procompetitive effects or objective justifications 
advanced by the defendant; and (3) determining whether the anticompetitive effects outweigh 
the procompetitive effects.  This analysis is known in United States jurisprudence as a “rule 
of reason” standard.  See generally United States v. Microsoft Corp. (Microsoft III), 253 F.3d 
34, 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  
 106  See Economides & Lianos, supra note 58, at 534. 
 107  See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962). 
 108  Economides & Lianos, supra note 58, at 55253. 
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ultimately, the plaintiff bears the burden of proof.109 
In contrast, E.U. antitrust law is concerned with protecting non-
dominant firms that compete in the tied product market.110  Consequently, 
E.U. courts apply a quasi-per se test, which presumes the questioned practice 
is anticompetitive if a dominant firm engages in conduct that restricts a 
rival’s ability to compete.111  However, E.U. antitrust law (at least in the 
context of technical tying) permits the dominant undertaking to advance 
certain procompetitive effects to objectively justify its conductbut 
ultimately, the defendant bears the burden of proof.112 
In the E.U. Microsoft case, the Commission took an unprecedented 
approachsimilar to the approach taken by the D.C. Court of Appealsand 
examined the anticompetitive effects of Microsoft’s bundling in light of its 
efficiency justifications and incentives to foreclose.113  The Commission 
stated: 
[T]here are indeed circumstances relating to the tying of WMP 
which warrant a closer examination of the effects that tying has 
on competition in this case.  While in classical tying cases, the 
Commission and the Courts considered the foreclosure effect for 
competing vendors to be demonstrated by the bundling of a 
separate product with the dominant product, in the case at issue, 
users can and do to a certain extent obtain third party media 
players through the Internet, sometimes for free. There are 
therefore indeed good reasons not to assume without further 
analysis that tying WMP constitutes conduct which by its very 
nature is liable to foreclosure of competition.114 
The court accepted the Commission’s application of a structured rule 
of reason standard, and then examined the issue of who bears the burden of 
proof under the analysis: 
[A]lthough the burden of proof of the existence of the 
circumstances that constitute an infringement of Article [102] EC 
is borne by the Commission, it is for the dominant undertaking 
concerned, and not for the Commission, before the end of the 
administrative procedure, to raise any plea of objective 
justification and to support it with arguments and evidence.  It then 
falls to the Commission, where it proposes to make a finding of 
an abuse of a dominant position, to show that the arguments and 
 
 109  Id. at 53536. 
 110  See id. at 54951. 
 111  Id. at 549. 
 112  Microsoft Corp. v. Commission, Case T201/04, [2007] E.C.R. II1491, ¶ 1144. 
 113  See Microsoft Corp., COMP/37.792, Commission Decision, [2004], O.J. L 32/33, ¶¶ 
84041. 
 114  Id. ¶ 841 (emphasis in the original). 
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evidence relied on by the undertaking cannot prevail and, 
accordingly, that the justification put forward cannot be 
accepted.115 
Microsoft argued its bundling produced efficiency gainsrelated to 
distribution and the quality of its Windows Media Player contentthat 
outweighed any of the identified anti-competitive effects.116 Microsoft 
claimed the Commission ignored the benefits software developers and 
Internet site creators received from the stable platform Microsoft created by 
fully integrating its media functionality in Windows OS.117  Microsoft argued 
that “remov[ing] [the] media functionality from the system consisting of 
Windows and Windows Media Player would create a series of problems to 
the detriment of consumers, software developers and Internet site 
creators . . . [and] would result in the degrading and fragmentation of that 
system.”118  However, the court, siding with the Commission, noted the issue 
was not with Microsoft’s business model of bundling, but rather, the issue 
was with Microsoft’s refusal to simultaneously offer “a version of [its] 
system without Windows Media Player, thus permitting [manufacturers] or 
end users wishing to do so to install the product of their choice on their client 
PC as the first streaming media player.”119 
The Court then rejected Microsoft’s “media functionality” argument, 
stating: 
[t]he fact that tying enables software developers and Internet site 
creators to be sure that Windows Media Player is present on 
virtually all client PCs in the world is precisely one of the main 
reasons why the Commission correctly took the view that the 
bundling led to the foreclosure of competing media players from 
the market.”120 
The court stressed the fact that manufacturers can satisfy the consumer 
demand for an operating system that incorporates a streaming media player 
without Microsoft’s exclusivity agreement.121  Accordingly, the advantages 
operators received from any uniform presence did not offset the 
anticompetitive effects of Microsoft’s tying arrangement.122  Thus, the court 
affirmed the Commission’s conclusion that Microsoft’s conduct resulted in 
an unjustifiable foreclosure of competition. 
Critically, the court did not identify any direct harm to consumersthis 
 
 115  Microsoft, [2007] E.C.R. II1491, ¶ 1144. 
 116  Id. ¶ 1091. 
 117  Id. ¶ 1146. 
 118  Id. ¶ 1147 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 119  Id. ¶ 1150. 
 120  Microsoft, [2007] E.C.R. II1491, ¶ 1151. 
 121  See id. ¶¶ 115557. 
 122  Id. ¶ 1151. 
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is where the E.U. and U.S. theoretical approaches drastically split.123  In 
accordance with E.U. antitrust principles, the General Court inferred that 
consumers were indirectly harmed by Microsoft’s competitive alteration of 
the media player market.124  This stems from the E.U.’s inclination to protect 
competitors as a way to strengthen consumer sovereignty in the long run.125  
Conversely, the dominant U.S. approach requires proof of direct consumer 
harmevidenced by increased prices or reduced output in the relevant 
market.126  This stems from the U.S. preference to protect overall 
competition without chilling innovation and reducing consumer-welfare.127 
While it may seem that the E.U. approach to technological tying has 
shifted towards affording antitrust defendants with a legitimate opportunity 
to overcome the presumed foreclosure of competition, in practice, proving 
the existence of objective justifications remains extremely difficult.128  The 
low standard of proof required for anticompetitive harm, combined with the 
fact that the Commission does not have to prove consumers have been 
actually or directly harmed, makes this “structured rule of reason” standard 
illusory.  In contrast, the rule of reason standard announced in the U.S. 
Microsoft case places a heightened burden of proof on plaintiffs, which 
ultimately dissuaded the DOJ from proceeding further against Microsoft.129  
Nevertheless, the E.U. Microsoft case illustrates that the Commission, and 
therefore E.U. courts, may be willing to examine certain procompetitive 
justifications for technological tying arrangements, which arguably do not 
foreclose competition and instead enhance consumer-welfare.  Enter Google. 
IV. GOOGLE V. COMMISSIONER 
A. Background 
In 1996, two Stanford University PhD students, Larry Page and Sergey 
Brin, developed an internet search engine named Google.130  Google is now 
the largest search engine in the world.131  In 2005, Google acquired Android, 
Inc., the start-up that initially developed the Android operating system to 
 
 123  Economides & Lianos, supra note 58, at 557–58. 
 124  Id. 
 125  See id. at 558. 
 126  Id. 
 127  See United States v. Microsoft Corp. (Microsoft III), 253 F.3d 34, 89 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 128  Economides & Lianos, supra note 58, at 551. 
 129  See Microsoft III, 253 F.3d at 95. 
 130  See Google Company History, GOOGLE.COM, https://www.google.com/about/our-
story (last visited Nov. 29, 2016). 
 131  See Konrad Krawczyk, Google is Easily the Most Popular Search Engine, But Have 
You Heard Who is in Second?, DIGITAL TRENDS (July 3, 2014, 11:34 AM), http://www.digital 
trends.com/web/google-baidu-are-the-worlds-most-popular-search-engines/. 
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coordinate the hardware and software functions of mobile devices.132  In 
2008, Google entered the mobile device industry with its release of the first 
Android-operated mobile devicethe HTC Dream.133  Android is Google’s 
operating system (OS) for mobile devices.134  Android is an open-source 
platform, which Google licenses free of charge to manufacturers of mobile 
devices (“manufacturers” or “customers”), developers of mobile 
applications, or any end user (“consumers”).135  Google also develops a 
variety of mobile apps that allow consumers to manage their mobile 
devices.136  Google’s most important app, Google Play, functions as a 
storefront for users to download other Google apps, as well as third-party 
appsthe vast majority of which are available for free.137  Google’s 
proprietary appse.g., Google Play, Google Maps, Gmail, YouTube, and 
Google Calendarcan be found on virtually all Android-operated mobile 
devices.138  Google permits manufacturers to pre-install a suite of proprietary 
appscalled Google Mobile Services (GMS)on their mobile devices.139  
Manufacturers, such as Samsung, receive GMS for free if they accept the 
conditions in Google’s Mobile Application Distribution Agreement 
(MADA).140 
Like many technology-based business models, Google operates in a 
multisided market.  A multisided market is a market “in which one or several 
platforms enable interactions between end-users and try to get the two (or 
multiple) sides ‘on board’ by appropriately charging each side.”141  On one 
side, Google’s market consists of smartphone and tablet owners who use 
mobile apps; the other sides consist of advertisers, app developers, and 
mobile device manufacturers.142  It is common practice for businesses 
operating in a multisided market to charge different prices to the different 
sides of the market.143  For example, while Google offers its apps for free to 
consumers, it collects fees from advertisers.144  Google attracts users by 
offering its apps for free.145  The more app users Google can attract, the more 
 
 132  See Cheng, supra note 2. 
 133  Id. 
 134  Id. 
 135  Id.; see also Walker, supra note 1. 
 136  Sidak, supra note 68, at 621. 
 137  See id. at 65960. 
 138  See id. 
 139  Id. at 660. 
 140  See id. at 669. 
 141  Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report, 37 RAND 
J. ECON. 645, 645 (2006). 
 142  Sidak, supra note 68, at 662. 
 143  See id. 
 144  See id. at 66264. 
 145  Id. at 663. 
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revenue Google generates from its mobile advertising.146  Advertising 
revenues then allow Google to recoup its investments in Android OS and 
mobile apps.147  Thus, Google’s practice of offering Android, Google apps, 
and GMS free of charge enables Google to attract consumers, develop 
competitive products, and increase profits through mobile advertising.148 
B. The Commission’s Statement of Objections and Google’s Response 
On April 20, 2016, the European Commission (the “Commission”) sent 
Google a Statement of Objections announcing its “preliminary view that 
Google has implemented a strategy on mobile devices to preserve and 
strengthen its dominance in general internet search.”149  In its Statement of 
Objections, the Commission alleges: (1) that Google unlawfully tied its 
Google Search and Google Chrome browser with its other proprietary apps, 
namely the Google Play Store; and (2) that Google unlawfully tied its 
Android OS to its proprietary apps, namely the Google Play Store and 
Google Search.150  The Commission is concerned that Google’s practices: 
(1) allow Google to abuse the dominant position of Google Search in general 
internet search services; (2) “affect the ability of competing mobile browsers 
to compete with Google Chrome;” and (3) “hinder the development of 
operating systems based on the Android open source code and the 
opportunities they would offer for the development of new apps and 
services.”151  Moreover, the Commission asserts Google’s conduct harms 
consumers by narrowing their choice of products and services, and stifling 
competition in the market.152 
The Commission also alleges that Google’s dominant position is 
protected by certain barriers to entry and by the significant costsassociated 
with losing their current apps, data, and contactsthat consumers, i.e., 
Android users, face if they wish to switch operating systems.153  For example, 
in the market for Android app stores, Google’s “Play Store accounts for more 
than 90% of apps downloaded on Android devices in the [European 
Economic Area].”154  The Commission argues that Google’s dominance is 
protected by the unavailability of downloadable app stores from the Play 
Store and the fact that consumers generally would not switch to other app 
 
 146  Id. 
 147  Id. at 664. 
 148  Sidak, supra note 68, at 664. 
 149  Statement of Objections, supra note 4. 
 150  Id. 
 151  Id. 
 152  Id. 
 153  Id. 
 154  Commission Fact Sheet, MEMO/16/1484 (Apr. 20, 2016) [hereinafter Fact Sheet]. 
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stores because they would have to purchase a new device and would face 
significant switching costs.155 
The Commission is concerned that “by reducing manufacturers’ 
incentives to pre-install competing browser apps and consumers’ incentives 
to download those apps, competition in both mobile browsers and general 
search has been adversely affected.”156  Accordingly, the Commission stated 
that it “seeks to ensure that manufacturers are free to choose which apps they 
pre-install on their devices.”157 The Commission is also concerned that the 
anti-fragmentation agreements have denied consumers access to innovative 
operating systems.158  In support, the Commission noted that Android is an 
open-source system that is supposed to allow anyone to freely develop their 
own modified mobile operating system.159  The Commission stated that 
while “EU antitrust rules allow dominant companies to put in place 
restrictions only when they are objectively justified . . . to date, Google has 
not been able to show this in relation to the restrictions in the ‘Anti-
Fragmentation Agreements.’”160  Apparently, “the Commission has evidence 
that the exclusivity condition affected whether certain device manufacturers 
and mobile network operators pre-installed competing search services.”161  If 
the Commission’s charges are upheld, Google could face a fine of up to ten 
percent of its annual turnover, which is close to $7.5 billion.162 
C. Distinguishing Google’s Conduct from the Microsoft Case 
There are three significant differences between Google’s alleged tying 
arrangement and the bundling practice found unlawful in Microsoft.  First, 
there is a strong argument that Google’s mobile suite is a single product 
offered for pre-installationrather than a bundle of distinct proprietary apps.  
Second, Google offers all its productsthe Android OS and its proprietary 
appsto customers free of charge.  Third, Google offers its Android OS 
without forcing customers to pre-install its apps.  The following analysis 
attempts to show how these unique factors raise substantial issues with the 
Commission’s case under the General Court’s approach in Microsoft. 
 
 155  Statement of Objections, supra note 4. 
 156  Id. 
 157  Fact Sheet, supra note 154. 
 158  Id. 
 159  See id. 
 160  Id. 
 161  Statement of Objections, supra note 4. 
 162  Mark Scott, Parallels Between Europe’s Antitrust Cases Against Google and 
Microsoft, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/11/technology/ 
google-microsoft-europe-antitrust-android.html. 
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i. Separate Products Test 
Google offers a suite of its proprietary apps (“GMS”) that mobile 
device manufactures can pre-install on Android-run devices.163  The issue is 
whether GMS is a bundle of separate products or a single product.  The 
Commission views the apps, such as the Play Store and Google Search, as 
separate products.164  But are these products separate?  Google can, should, 
and most likely will argue that the suite of apps offered for pre-installation 
are not an aggregation of separate products, but rather a single product. 
Certainly, there is an independent demand for each proprietary app.165  
However, GMS represents an entirely new market in which companies 
compete for manufacturers to pre-install their suite of mobile apps.166  From 
a demand-side perspective, the Commission argues that if given the choice, 
manufacturers generally would pre-install an app store, a search engine, and 
a web browser separately.167  Yet, this ignores that manufacturers may prefer 
to acquire and pre-install a mobile suite because obtaining each app 
individually would significantly increase their search and transaction 
costs.168 
From a supply-side perspective, the Commission argues that rival 
search engines and browsers are unable to become the default services 
because Google Search and Chrome are tied to the Play Store.169  However, 
unlike Microsoft’s bundling of its WMP and PC operating system where the 
cost of WMP was included in the overall cost of manufacturers installing the 
operating system, the cost of pre-installing Google Search and Chrome are 
not reflected in the cost of licensing Google’s Play Storemanufacturers 
acquire the complete GMS for free.170  Moreover, Google’s mobile suite 
product does not compete with the suppliers of individual apps.  Rather, it 
competes with other companies that offer manufacturers a mobile suite of 
apps for pre-installation, such as Yandex171 and Microsoft.  If companies 
offering mobile suites, like Google, are required to license their proprietary 
 
 163  Sidak, supra note 68, at 660. 
 164  See generally Statement of Objections, supra note 4. 
 165  For example, there is a demand for search engines separate from Internet browsers.  A 
consumer may use Google Search on her iPhone, but prefer to use Safari Browser to “surf” 
the web. 
 166  Sidak, supra note 68, at 680. 
 167  See Statement of Objections, supra note 4. 
 168  See Sidak, supra note 68, at 680. 
 169  Statement of Objections, supra note 4. 
 170  See Walker, supra note 1. 
 171  See Sidak, supra note 68, at 680.  Yandex is a Russian search and software company 
that offers its own mobile app suite that can be pre-installed on Android operating mobile 
devices and others.  See Stephen Shankland, Yandex Suite of Android Tools Sidesteps Google, 
CNET (Feb. 20, 2014, 4:14 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/yandex-suite-of-free-android-
tools-sidesteps-google/. 
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apps separately, then the market for mobile suites will no longer exist. 
The argument that GMS is a single-product is ironically bolstered by 
the Commission’s second allegation that Google unlawfully conditions the 
pre-installation of its proprietary apps on manufacturers exclusively using 
Google’s Android OS.  Nevertheless, the Commission’s concern with 
Google tying its Android OS (tied product) with the pre-installation of its 
proprietary apps (tying product) is well supported by the separate product 
test.  Google’s “Anti-Fragmentation Agreements” require that manufacturers 
agree to not sell modified Android operating systems (“Android forks”) if 
they want to pre-install GMS.172  Under the separate products test, there is 
no distinguishing factor between Google’s practice and Microsoft’s bundling 
of its operating system with its media player.  However, the separate products 
test does not end the anticompetitive inquiry.  Thus, the following discussion 
will focus on Google’s bundling of Android OS and GMS. 
ii. Coercion 
The Commission alleges that manufacturers do not have a choice to 
obtain GMS (tying product) without agreeing to use Android OS (tied 
product).173  A tying arrangement violates EU antitrust law if the dominant 
undertaking does not give customers a choice to obtain the tying product 
without the tied product.174  The issue is whether Google’s practice compels 
consumers, directly or indirectly, to accept supplementary obligations that 
affect consumer sovereignty.175 
Factually, this is the opposite of the tying arrangement in Microsoft.  In 
Microsoft, the tying product was Windows OS and the tied product was 
WMP.176  The Microsoft court was concerned with protecting the competing 
media player suppliers in order to maintain consumer sovereignty.177  
Essentially, consumer sovereignty was impaired because Microsoft’s 
practice eliminated consumers’ ability to influence the price, quality, and 
innovative process according to their own preferences.178  Here, the 
Commission is concerned with protecting companies that compete to offer 
Android forks.179  Specifically, the Commission asserts that Google’s 
conduct “prevent[s] manufacturers from selling smart mobile devices based 
on a competing Android fork which had the potential of becoming a credible 
 
 172  Statement of Objections, supra note 4. 
 173  Id. 
 174  See Microsoft Corp. v. Commission, Case T201/04, [2007] E.C.R. II1491, ¶ 
86064; see also Economides & Lianos, supra note 58, at 529. 
 175  See Microsoft, [2007] E.C.R. II1491, ¶ 864. 
 176  See id at 887. 
 177  Economides & Lianos, supra note 58, at 54243. 
 178  Id. at 543. 
 179  Statement of Objections, supra note 4. 
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alternative to the Google Android operating system.”180 
However, Google’s conduct ultimately does not hinder consumer 
choice.181  Google offers both Android OS and GMS free of charge.182  
Google does not require manufacturers to pre-install GMS in exchange for 
its Android operating system“GMS and Android are not 
interdependent.”183  For example, Amazon’s Fire smartphone and Nokia’s X 
smartphone operate on the Android OS but do not come pre-installed with 
GMS.184  Moreover, manufacturers and consumers can obtain Google Search 
and Chrome on mobile devices that do not operate on Android OS.185  
Although manufacturers cannot pre-install these apps, consumers ultimately 
decide which search engines and browsers they want to use regardless of 
what operating system they have.  Unlike Microsoft’s WMPwhich was 
impossible to uninstallan Android user is free to uninstall Google Search 
and Chrome and replace them with alternative apps.186  Although the court 
in Microsoft applied a strict coercion test to preserve consumer sovereignty 
(or at least in theory), Google’s conduct does not affect the ability of 
consumers to influence the price, quality, and innovative process according 
to their preferences. 
iii. Foreclosure of Competition 
The most important issue in the Commission’s case against Google is 
whether tying the Android OS to GMS forecloses competition in the market 
for mobile phone operating systems.  E.U. antitrust law is concerned with 
protecting competitors because a dominant undertaking’s alteration to the 
competitive structure indirectly harms consumers.187  In Microsoft, the 
court’s main concern was with Microsoft’s refusal to offer an operating 
system without WMP.188  This effectively foreclosed competition in the 
media player market because manufacturersand therefore 
 
 180  Id. 
 181  See Aleksandra Eriksson, Google rejects EU antitrust charges on Android, 
EUOBSERVER (Nov. 10, 2016, 5:56 PM), https://euobserver.com/economic/135865 (quoting 
Daniel Castro, the Vice President of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, 
“[t]he root of the problem with EU regulators’ complaints is that they are relying on outdated 
economic theories.  They do not seem to understand that innovation-based industries, like 
mobile operating systems, operate differently than conventional industries.”). 
 182  See Walker, supra note 1; see also Sidak, supra note 68, at 65761. 
 183  Sidak, supra note 68, at 660. 
 184  Id. at 66061. 
 185  Id. at 659; see also Geoffrey Manne, The EU’s Antitrust Complaints Are Contrived, 
WIRED (Nov. 20, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/11/eus-android-antitrust-
complaints-contrived/. 
 186  See Walker, supra note 1; see also Manne, supra note 185. 
 187  See Economides & Lianos, supra note 58, at 557. 
 188  Microsoft Corp. v. Commission, Case T201/04, [2007] E.C.R. II1491, ¶ 1150. 
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consumerscould not obtain Windows OS without pre-installing WMP.189  
The Commission’s case against Google is lacking a comparable distortion of 
the competitive structure. 
The first issue is that the Commission ignores a significant portion of 
Google’s competitors.  Google competes with closed operating systems such 
as Apple iOS and Windows Phone OS.190  In Google’s response to the 
Statement of Objections, Google stated that “[t]o ignore competition with 
Apple is to miss the defining feature of today’s competitive smartphone 
landscape,” and cited to the Commission’s own market survey in which 
eighty-nine percent of respondents confirmed that Apple and Android are 
competitors.191  Unlike Android, Apple iOS is exclusively available on 
Apple’s mobile devices.192  Windows Phone OS is also a closed operating 
system.193  By ignoring competitors such as Apple and Microsoft in the 
operating system market, and focusing solely on Android fork operating 
systems, the Commission essentially favors closed-source over open-source 
platforms.194 
The second issue with the Commission’s narrow market approach is 
that the competitors, i.e., suppliers of Android forks, are only able to develop 
Android forks and compete with Android because Google created the open-
source Android platform.  Google can distribute Android OS and its 
proprietary apps free of charge because it “lowers prices for phone makers 
and consumers, while still letting [Google] sustain [its] substantial 
investment in Android and [Google] Play.”195  The more app users Google 
attracts, the more revenue Google generates from its mobile advertising.  
Advertising revenues then allow Google to recoup its investments in 
Android and mobile apps.  Thus, Google’s practice of offering Android, 
Google apps, and GMS free of charge enables Google to attract consumers, 
develop competitive products, and increase profits through mobile 
advertising.  If Google cannot recover its investments in Android and mobile 
apps, then it will no longer be able to provide the open-source platform that 
enables competitors to develop Android forks in the first instance.  The 
result: “less innovation, less choice, less competition, and higher prices.”196  
Unfortunately, the cost of the Commission’s case will not fall on the 
manufacturers, but rather, the end consumers.197 
 
 189  Id. 
 190  See Walker, supra note 1; see also Sidak, supra note 68, at 65859. 
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 194  Walker, supra note 1. 
 195  Id. 
 196  Id. 
 197  See Manne, supra note 185 (noting that if the Commission’s case is enforced, Google 
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V. CONCLUSION 
If the Commission drafts a decision prohibiting Google’s business 
practices and that decision is formally adopted, then Google should appeal 
the decision to the General Court.  The General Court should then proceed 
cautiously and analyze Google’s alleged unlawful tying arrangement under 
a rule of reason standard to determine whether the anticompetitive effects 
outweigh the pro-competitive effects of Google’s practice.  Google’s 
conduct does not foreclose competition by its very nature.198  Rather, Google 
invites and encourages competition by offering its Android OS as an open-
source platform.  Moreover, Google’s conduct enhances consumer welfare 
by lowering prices and promoting innovation, all while preserving consumer 
sovereignty.  While Google may still bear the ultimate burden of proving the 
procompetitive effects of its conduct outweigh the anticompetitive effects, 
the General Court should refrain from blindly following the Commission’s 
findings.  The fact that Google offers all its products free of charge combined 
with the fact that end consumers can easily uninstall any of Google’s mobile 
apps, clearly distinguishes Google’s conduct from Microsoft’s unlawful 
bundling practice.  An E.U. court presented with the Commission’s case 
against Google should not feel restrained by current antitrust jurisprudence 
because the unique circumstances certainly “warrant a closer examination of 
the effects that tying has on competition.”199 
Look down at your phone.  Unlock the home screen.  Now imagine 
Google Search, Chrome Browser, and the Play Store no longer appear.  
Instead, your phone manufacturer insists you download these apps for a fee.  
Are you satisfied? 
 
 
will have to charge licensing fees to pre-install apps, and the costs will ultimately be passed 
on to end consumers in the form of higher mobile device prices). 
 198  See generally Dirk Auer, Appropriability and the European Commission’s Android 
Investigation (Univ. of Liége Sch. L., Competition and Innovation Inst., Working Paper, 
2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2767452. 
 199  Microsoft Corp., COMP/37.792, Commission Decision, [2004], O.J. L 32/33, ¶ 841. 
